Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Asymmetric Information, and Risk Sharing in Procurement Contracting
- 期刊名称The RAND Journal of Economics
- 作者David P. Baron and David Besanko
- 卷第18卷
- 期第4期
- 印刷ISSN0741-6261
- 文件大小534.82KB
- 发表时间1987
- DOI10.2307/2555639
- 页码509-532
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