A General Equilibrium Model of Multi-Party Competition
- 作者Marek M. Kaminski
- 卷第26卷
- 期第2期
- 印刷ISSN0176-1714
- 电子ISSN1432-217X
- 文件大小286.89KB
- 发表时间2006-04
- DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0095-1
- 页码333-361
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