Collusionby Asymmetrically Informed Firms
- 作者Richard Kihlstrom; Xavier Vives
- 卷第1卷
- 期第2期
- 印刷ISSN1058-6407
- 电子ISSN1530-9134
- 文件大小1279.31KB
- 发表时间1992
- DOI10.1111/j.1430-9134.1992.00371.x
- 页码371-396
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